Russia's Ambassador to Norway: Warns of Political Vacuum in the Arctic Region

Norsk versjon.

Nikolay Korchunov was appointed Russian Ambassador to Norway by presidential decree on October 1st. He previously served as Russia's Ambassador at Large for Arctic cooperation and Senior Arctic Official in the Arctic Council for many years.

The Arctic Council is the foremost international forum for cooperation in the Arctic but its level of activity is still reduced in the wake of Russia's warfare in Ukraine.

Since February, the council's working groups have been able to resume official meetings in digital format, while meetings at the diplomatic and political levels have remained paused. 

The absence of pan-Arctic political dialogue creates an unfortunate void that others flock to, Korchunov recently stated to the Russian state-owned news agency RIA Novosti. He elaborates on the statement to High North News:

“I will refrain from listing specific countries or other entities that show increased interest in the Arctic. My key message is that the lack of political dialogue, the loss of trust, as well as the alienation among the leading actors of the cooperation in the region inevitably leads to an increase in uncertainty and creates a vacuum that others will seek to fill,” the ambassador writes in an email.

'At the expense of Arctic states'

“It is clear that some non-regional actors seek to assert themselves at the expense of the Arctic states. Their rise in the Arctic affairs may have a limiting impact on the capabilities of the Arctic states to effectively manage the region. Many cannot resist the temptation to use the current uncertain situation in their favor,” Korchunov considers.

“Surely, non-regional actors pursue different goals – for some it is access to natural fossil and biological resources as well as transport corridors that is paramount. Others, on the contrary, push for introducing restrictions on economic activities in the Arctic.”

“Some organizations and groups of non-regional states do not only arrange discussions of the Arctic issues, but also adopt strategic documents on the matter,” he points out.

The ambassador likely refers to the EU's annual Arctic Forum and Indigenous People's Dialogue, as well as the new EU-funded format for Arctic Youth Dialogue.

Other likely reference points are the UK's and Germany's updated Arctic policies launched in 2023 and 2024, respectively.

Ambiguous

Russia believes that states and organizations, primarily from Europe and Asia, are seeking to fill the void in the Arctic. Still, more recently, Moscow has also noted an increased interest in the region from Arabic states. 

This was stated by Korchunov this fall when asked by Elizabeth Buchanan, Senior Researcher at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, who refers to his comments in an op-ed in the National Interest. 

However, Russia itself has opened up to cooperation in the Arctic with non-Western countries, not least China, while also keeping the door ajar for "efficient work in the Arctic Council." 

"Our line in the Arctic Council will depend on the situation's further development and respect for Russian interests. With the council's weakened role and effectiveness, provoked by our Western partners, we are already engaged in active dialogue with an Arctic agenda in various formats with other countries and organizations," said Korchunov in May 2023 after the handover of the AC chairship to Norway.

From a Russian perspective, the difference is likely that Russia's engagement with non-regional actors is about "mutually beneficial cooperation," while the aforementioned "vacuum" is sought to be filled at the cost of both Russia and the other Arctic states – including their sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic.

'Securitization, but some progress'

Regarding the western Arctic states' approach to the region, Korchunov now states the following:

“We note with concern securitization of the Arctic policies of other Arctic Council member-states. The key task is to preserve the Arctic as the territory of peace, stability, and mutually beneficial cooperation. Pending issues on the Arctic agenda do not lie in the military dimension.”

Yet, his assessment of the council's situation also holds a small positive note.

“Recently, we have noticed some improvements in the stagnant state of the Arctic Council. I am referring to the gradual resumption of the activities of the working groups of the council in the autumn of this year,” the ambassador points out and continues:

“However, I would rather not exaggerate the results – the self-restraining decision, previously adopted by a number of the council’s member-states, unfortunately, continues to weaken the spirit and atmosphere of cooperation, and negatively affects the current state of affairs in the organization. The Arctic Council, in a sense, has turned into a virtual forum.”

Have noticed Norwegian efforts

At the same time, Norway's chairship is receiving positive feedback from the Russian side.

“Overall, we assess positively Norway's work as the Arctic Council chair,” writes Korchunov and continues:

“In the current challenging period, we note the efforts of the Norwegian chairship to resume the regular full-scale activities of the council, though the negative impact of decisions previously taken by some of the member states is evident.”

“In addition, not all of them share the Norwegian approach to get the Arctic Council back to full-format work. Time will tell whether Norway and other member-states are ready to cooperate constructively.”

No high expectations for Danish chairship

In the spring of 2025, the Kingdom of Denmark will take over the chairship of the council, an event that Russia takes a reserved approach toward.

“We have no high expectations about the upcoming Arctic Council chairship of Denmark. As far as I am aware, Copenhagen hasn’t held by far any consultations with Russia regarding its plans for 2025-2027, nor have they informed us about their priorities,” notes Korchunov.

“That said, I believe that the success of the upcoming chairship of Denmark will largely depend on what role the actual Arctic territories – the Faroe Islands and Greenland – will have,” he adds.

Under “Department of European problems”

The new ambassador to Norway can also inform that the responsibility for Arctic issues in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is now held by Vladislav Maslennikov, Director of the Department of European Problems. 

Until this fall, the department was known as the Department of Pan-European Cooperation. The MFA's spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told the Russian state-owned news agency TASS that the name change was due to the "obvious degradation of multilateral cooperation institutions in Europe. "

“Maslennikov has been appointed as the Russian Senior Arctic Official in the Arctic Council by the Ministry’s leadership. The position of Ambassador at Large for Arctic Cooperation no longer exists,” states Korchunov.

Paradoxically, the US finally appointed its first Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs this fall, Mike Sfraga, and Canada recently announced the establishment of such an ambassador position in its new Arctic strategy.

It is also worth noting that Korchunov still works with matters of northern and Arctic nature in his new position:

"I have a working dialogue with my Norwegian colleagues in my new capacity, including constructive contacts on cooperation in high latitudes," he told the aforementioned RIA Novosti.

Interaction with China

In the face of, seen with Russian eyes, both 'European and Arctic problems,' Russia has, as mentioned, attempted to play the field when it comes to cooperation in the region.

With this approach, Russia has particularly developed its collaboration with China – with a particular focus on transport and energy.

When asked about the status of the cooperation with Beijing and how Moscow wants it to develop further, the ambassador answers the following:

“The cooperation of Russia and China in the Arctic is multifaceted, focused on deepening practical cooperation in the interests of sustainable development of the region and is based on the support of heads of state,” writes Korchunov and continues:

“In recent years, a number of joint high-level statements have been adopted. They determine the direction of our bilateral cooperation in the High North. In a joint statement in March 2023, it was noted that the parties advocate for preserving the region as the territory of peace, stability and constructive cooperation. This approach was then confirmed by the heads of states in a statement following the state visit of the President of Russia to China in May 2024.”

In process

“In November 2024, Russia and China held the first meeting of the Subcommittee on cooperation on the Northern Sea Route. The purpose of this new format is to work out all the mechanisms and details that would help foster safe and sustainable Arctic shipping for the sake of developing this global transport corridor and creating a joint program for expansion of transit on the sea route,” Korchunov elaborates.

The meeting, which took place in St. Petersburg, was chaired by Rosatom's Director General Alexey Likhachev and China's Minister of Transport Liu Wei.

“Despite this being the first meeting of the subcommittee, we have already formalized a number of agreements between our nations regarding the safety of navigation. We are working towards constructive collaboration on other significant matters. I believe we have established a strong basis for the future endeavors of this subcommittee,” said Likhachev in his opening speech.

Rosatom is a Russian state-owned multi-industrial holding company. It manages the country’s nuclear energy assets and has a major responsibility for the development of the NSR. Rosatom’s subsidiary Atomflot operates Russia’s nuclear-powered icebreakers. 

Regular high-level policy dialogue

Korchunov also refers to regular consultations between Russia and China's MFAs on Arctic matters, which he has led as the Russian Arctic Ambassador with Chinese counterparts at the level of special representatives/directors of departments. 

Such dialogue includes representatives for interested parties in both countries, encompassing public bodies and other types of organizations. 

“During another round in September 2024, we discussed in detail the implementation of joint projects in the fields of energy, investment, science, and transport. A permanent Russian-Chinese working group on cooperation in the Arctic is well-proven. It focuses on the issues of investment cooperation, research activities, and environmental protection,” outlines Korchunov.

The development and use of the NSR was included in the discussion on transport. Another topic at the meeting was the prospects for further interaction within the Arctic Council. 

The agenda for the corresponding consultation last fall was the same.

The Russian MFA's reports from the two meetings are also nearly identical. Among other things, they once again state that Moscow and Beijing agree to strengthen bilateral cooperation on Arctic matters further.

'Not military oriented'

The ambassador also comments on Russia and China's emerging military collaboration in the Arctic, which the US DoD is particularly on the watch for.

In later years, the countries conducted two operations with marine vessels and one with bombers in and over international waters off the coast of Alaska. In September, Chinese Coast Guard vessels also had their first patrol in the Arctic Ocean with Russian Border Guard ships.

“Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic is not directed against third countries and does not lie in the military dimension. I would like to emphasize that the Russian-Chinese joint exercises in the Far East were exclusively related to the Pacific region. Attempts to somehow associate it with the Arctic have no ground,” claims Korchunov.

A composite image

While Russia and China share certain interests in the region, particularly regarding energy production and the development of the NSR, the cooperation between them is still limited, says senior researchers Ingvill Moe Elgsaas and Rebekka Åsnes Sagild at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in a recent research article.

In an interview with HNN, they summarize some aspects that limit the development of Russian-Chinese cooperation: mutual skepticism and a lack of trust, as well as the asymmetry in the countries' power balance and degree of self-interest in the Arctic.

"The Arctic is not a priority for China, while Russia fears Chinese influence in this strategically important region," writes Ingvill Moe Elgsaas and Rebekka Åsnes Sagild and continues:

"At the same time, Russia lacks alternative cooperation partners, and a certain involvement, including in the Arctic, is consistent with China's identity and ambitions as a global actor."

By extension of the West's sanctions against Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has become increasingly more dependent on Beijing, as the Russian economy largely relies on energy export.

“Over 80 percent of Russia’s natural gas production and nearly 20 percent of its petroleum production comes from the Arctic, and Russia is increasingly turning to the People’s Republic of China to fund this extraction and purchase these resources,” the US DoD writes in its new Arctic strategy.

Paints contrasts

“Russia’s priorities in the Arctic derive from the provisions of the Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security until 2035. On this basis, we cooperate with all actors involved, including China,” continues Korchunov.

As is customary from the Russian side, he also paints a negative picture of the West and a favorable one of Russia: 

“While focus on confrontation, antagonism and forceful scenarios to ensure their interests in the Arctic at the expense of others are increasingly prevailing in the approaches of some Arctic states, the Russian strategy aims at finding solutions to other challenges – sustainable development of the region, preserving the fragile nature of the Arctic as well as the way of life of Indigenous Peoples and overall ensuring the well-being of all people living in the North.”

With this, the ambassador likely refers in particular to the US.

“As to the international dimension, the Russian strategy highlights the importance to cooperate on search and rescue, economic and humanitarian ties, scientific work and the support of Indigenous Peoples. I would reiterate that the strategy does not say a word about confrontation with other states,” he adds.

Looking ahead

The aforementioned Senior Researcher Elizabeth Buchanan believes that the time of "Arctic exceptionalism" – where conflicts in other areas are kept at an arms distance from the Arctic cooperation – is clearly over. At the same time, she states the following:

“Korchunov is less sure the Arctic has passed a point of no return when it comes to international engagement, stating a glimmer of “common sense … is still present judging by the statements of some United States representatives” means he is hopeful for a “return to inclusive pan-Arctic dialogue sooner or later,” writes Buchanan in the National Interest.

In light of the emerging Russian-Chinese cooperation in the region, she also notes this:

“Trump 2.0 now has the difficult task of prying apart Beijing and Moscow to locate a mutual interest between Russia and the United States in reviving any semblance of “low tension” in the Arctic.”