Op-ed: Security for Our Sea Lanes of Communication in the High North
The Svalbard-Norway fibreoptic cable at its marine entry point at Hotellneset, northwest of Longyearbyen, Svalbard. The cable is owned by Space Norway, and operated by Telenor. It serves Svalbard with broadband. (Photo: Bjoertvedt - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0)
Op-ed: US Army Veteran and Historian Mike Thornton takes a look at the vulnerability of the High North's undersea cables and the dangers of hybrid warfare. "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance," he writes in this op-ed.
This is an opinion piece written by an external contributor. All views expressed are the writer's own.
The Svalbard archipelago is located hundreds of kilometers from the Norwegian mainland. Receiving stations on the island allow optimum
connection to satellites in polar orbit. Vast amounts of data are transferred via undersea cable to and from the mainland of Norway.
The internet went dark in Longyearbyen at 04:10 on 7 January 2022. An investigation revealed that the 1,300 km long cable had been damaged by humans, not natural causes. The cable had been smashed, allowing sea water to ground out the data transfer lines.
Operations in the Grey Zone
This is a period of raising tensions, short of active warfare. It will allow an adversary to “shape” or control events prior to armed conflict or to just weaken a potential adversary politically or economically. It may also be used to deny an adversary a future resource such as communications, an electrical power grid or perhaps fuel or natural gas supplies.
Hybrid warfare is used to maintain plausible deniability
An expansive definition of hybrid warfare includes political interference, sabotage, and subversion. A nation or a non-state actor will argue that a specific act of destruction was not caused by them. While hybrid warfare can and will be conducted during open hostilities, it is usually reserved for operations during the gray zone.
A potential adversary seeks to challenge the countries in the Arctic region to gain an advantage through cyber-attacks, proxy attacks, disinformation, etc.
It is important to understand that one country may be actively engaged in hybrid warfare against another while the victim is deceived into believing these are just random acts of misfortune. The whole objective of hybrid warfare in the grey zone is to make it appear that the aggressor is innocent.
Social media has opened a whole new avenue for disinformation and propaganda. It is no longer limited to interaction among friends but is sometimes hijacked by nations who wish to spread disinformation. The goal may be to reduce the political will to support our military and to create distrust in our own governments.
Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech in September of 2024, saying that Russia is at war with NATO for supporting Ukraine. A few months later, a telecommunications cable linking Sweden and Lithuania was cut. This may have just been a coincidence. If not, this could be the quintessential example of hybrid warfare.
We are likely to see an intensification of hybrid warfare to sow discord in our communities. Look for an attempt to affect operations throughout the High North, perhaps a cyber-attack to cause a power disruption among the many possibilities.
Examples of hybrid warfare
Although not in the Arctic, here is an illustration of a few examples of hybrid warfare that could easily migrate here. They appear to be eerily similar in nature to the incident near Svalbard in 2022.
The C-Lion1 data communications cable was cut which connects Germany and Finland. In this case, a joint Swedish and Finnish investigation focused on the Chinese bulk carrier YI Peng 3.
In December last year, the Estlink 2 power cable connecting Estonia to Finland was cut. The Finnish electricity grid reported a power outage, and Finnish Border guards seized the Eagle S, “a Russian shadow tanker.” The damage and repair costs are estimated at tens of millions of euros, in addition to the loss to the power grid.
Vessels transiting an area of the High North seas where undersea cables are placed may simply drag their anchor along the bottom of the seabed. This simple process could crush or tear a cable on the bottom, causing a power or internet disruption. Honest mariners know where undersea cables are laid and would never intentionally lower an anchor near an undersea cable.
We sometimes fail to appreciate the importance of undersea cables that connect us to the vital internet. The instant internet communication we enjoy worldwide highly depends on these undersea pathways. Additionally, they also provide control to offshore gas and oil exploration facilities.
Summary:
Most countries have a vested interest in protecting the freedom of the seas for commerce. Nowhere is this doctrine more important than in the High North. The topography and the development of regional port facilities make our sea lanes vital for the economic health and security of the Arctic region.
Every year brings an increased ability to better navigate through the Arctic seas as the summer ice pack recedes. This dramatically increases the utility of Arctic commercial or military vessels. The Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route offer a greatly reduced distance compared to traditional sea lanes on many transits.
The economy of the Arctic countries depends on the freedom of the seas, as does our collective and our economic security.
Make no mistake, we are protected by our military and intelligence agencies that are ever watchful. My intent here is to bring this series of events into focus so that we can be aware that this threat of hybrid warfare is real and will continue. Even in this peaceful and beautiful county we call the High North, the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.
